Beneath the Red Curtain: Intentions and Motivations Behind an Authoritarian Regime\u27s Move Toward Democracy by Sur \u2703, Andrew G.
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Political Science Department
2003
Beneath the Red Curtain: Intentions and
Motivations Behind an Authoritarian Regime's
Move Toward Democracy
Andrew G. Sur '03
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Sur '03, Andrew G., "Beneath the Red Curtain: Intentions and Motivations Behind an Authoritarian Regime's Move Toward
Democracy" (2003). Honors Projects. Paper 9.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj/9
•
 
Beneath the Red Curtain:
 
Intentions and Motivations behind an Authoritarian
 
Regime's Move toward Democracy
 
Andy Sur
 
Research Honors Project
 
International Studies Senior Seminar
 
Committee Chair: William Munro
 
Conunittee Members: Abigail Jahiel, Thomas Lutze, and
 
Michael Weis
 
April 2003
 
•
 
Introduction: 
Although Mao Zedong stated that people's democracy was the surest way to maintain the Chinese 
Communist Party's popular basel, the idea of implementing elections at the village level was unheard 
of during the Mao era. The post-Mao era, however, has brought monumental changes in China's 
political, economic, and social structures. These changes have increased rural instability among 
China's peasants who consist of nearly 75% of China's total population. 2 Indeed some of the most 
profound changes and instructive lessons in China's contemporary history have come from the 
countryside.3 
The latest reform in China's near one million villages has resulted from the implementation of the 
1998 Organic Law for Local People's Con!:,Tfesses and Government. In a historically groundbreaking 
decision, the National People's Congress (NPC) of China approved the Organic Law, which allows 
villagers throughout China to elect their own village leadership every three years. The law embodies 
the idea of self-government in two ways: Villagers can now elect their own government and village 
government has a defined sphere of autonomous activity. 4 In addition, the Organic Law gives village 
committees significant responsibilities such as public welfare, dispute resolution, and communicating 
villagers' views to the township government.5 The Organic Law also gives village government 
committees key economic responsibilities including the management and allocation of village lands 
and collective property, as well as the duty to support cooperative economic undertakings and village 
production, all matters ofdirect concern to the villagers.6 
The literature addressing the Organic Law is insufficient because scholars have neglected to fully 
link China's economic reform period beginning in the 1970s, periods ofmassive rebellion and unrest, 
and the Party's attempt to mobilize the countryside through socialist education campaigns to political 
decentralization and the village election system. Although an extensive amount has been written 
about the Organic Law, a more detailed analysis of the central government's true intentions is needed 
1 O'Brit:ll, Kt:vin and Li~Ulji,Ulg Li. "111t: Struggk OWf Vil1agt: Ekctions". 111t: Paradox of China's Post-Mao Rt:fimns.
 
Editt:d by Mt:rlt: Goldman ,Uld Rodmck MacFarquhar «(~anlbridgt:: Harvard 1Jniwfsity I'rt:ss 1999), pp. 129-144. (Pagt: 1~~)
 
2 Cht:ll, Wt:ixing. "Pt:as~mt Challt:ngt: inPoSt-Collllllunist China". Journal (!lContemporary China. No.6 Vol. 14
 
1997, pp. 101-115. (Pagt: 101)
 
3 Pastof, Robcrt A. and Qingsh,m Tan. "111t: Mt:~ming of China's Villagt: Ekctions". The China Quarterly. No. 162 JUllt:
 
2000, pp. 490-512. (Pagt: 512)
 
4 Kdliht:r, David. "TIlt: (~hint:st: Ikbatt: ()Vt:f Villagt: Sdf:'( Tovt:fl1llIt:nt". The (nina Journal. no ~7, J~Ul. 19'J7, pp. 6~­

X6. (Pagt: (4)
 
5 HOfsdy, .Tmmt: 1'. "Villagt:f Sdf-(Jovt:m~mCt: ,Uld Rult: ofLaw in China". Villager SelFlf;overnment and Rural Social
 
lJe:velopment Confi'rence Papers. Bt:ijing: St:ptt:mbt:f 2 -5, 2001, pp. 106- B2. (Pagt: lOX)
 
6 Thid.
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in order to further understand the government's efforts to improve inconsistent enforcement 
measures and to standardize election procedures. In addition, further analysis aids in determining 
how the central government has responded to current implementation problems and rural issues in 
the future. Indeed the countryside is entering a very fragile and unpredictable period, as the Chinese 
agricultural sector will be severely weakened due to China's accession into the World Trade 
Organization. 
Despite numerous implementation problems such as the absence of localized enforcement 
mechanisms and the lack of standardized election procedures, the Organic Law is a significant piece 
of legislation that promotes self-governance and democratic consciousness among China's rural 
masses. Elections are the most effective instrument for assuring China's stability whether the 
economy does well or poorly? by allowing the central government to devolve its authority to lower 
branches of government in the countryside. Elections are designed to increase mass support for the 
Party. In addition, elections represent a mechanism to produce leaders who can seize control and 
generate a better means for getting villagers to do what the state wants8, and grassroots democracy is 
understood to be fully compatible with strong state contro1.9 In this context, the village self­
government pro!:,rram is an effort to rejuvenate village leadership by cleaning out incompetent, 
corrupt, and high-handed cadres, all for the purpose of consolidating the current regime. IO 
Evidence suggests that the central government's primary aim behind its approval of the Organic Law 
was to shed itself of the risk and responsibility of directly addressing a problem that is far too out of 
control to solve, the Chinese countryside. The Chinese government's current efforts to implement 
necessary enforcement measures to strengthen the inte!:,rrity and fairness of elections are weak. Rural 
China was a bomb waiting to explode during the debate over self-governance in the late 1990's. The 
situation in the Chinese countryside today is also extremely fragile and unpredictable. The Organic 
Law has allowed the central government to pass the responsibility of attending to the bomb along to 
someone else before it exploded on the front door step of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. 
7 Cht:ll, Wt:ixing. "Pt:asant Chalkngt: in Post-Communist China". Journal ofContemporary China. No.6 Vol. 14
 
1997, pp. 101-115. (Pagt: 101)
 
xKdliht:r, David. "Tht: Chim:St: Dt:batt: Owr Villagt: Sdf-c"ovt:mmt:nt". The ('hina Journal. llO 37, J'm. 1997, p. 63-X6.
 
(Pagt: 70) and O'Brit:n, Kt:vin ,md Lianjiang Li. "Accommodating 'Ikmocracy' in a Ont: Party Statt::
 
Introducing Villagt: Ekctions in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 JUllt: 2000. (Pagt: 4X9)
 
9 O'Brit:ll, Kt:vin and Lianjiang Li. "Accommodating 'Dt:mocracy' in a Ollt: Party Statt:: Introducing Vil1agt: Ekctions
 
in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 JUllt: 2000. (Pagt: 4X9)
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Literature Review: 
Many scholars have contemplated the meaning of the Organic Law through qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. The existing literature regarding the Organic Law addresses two themes. One 
set of sources uses an institutionalist perspective by examining the National People's Congress and 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs' motives and actions to establish the village electoral systemll . The 
other standing works examine the effects of the Organic Law by measuring the accountability of 
village officials under the election system and establishing an ar,gument as to whether or not 
democracy, in some form or another, is founding the base for self-governance and the rule of law. 12 
Kevin 0 'Brien and Lianjiang Li describe village self-government as an effort to exchange limited 
democratic rights for popular compliance with unpopular state policies such as !:,Tfain procurement, 
taxes, and birth control. 13 Similarly, Daniel Kelliher suggests that village elections are designed to 
improve the quality of village leadership and are regarded, even by their proponents, as a way to 
implicate villagers in the execution of unpopular state policies. 14 David Zweig comments on the 
process of decentralization and ar!:,'Ues that an alliance between farmers and reformers pushed the 
process of developing the countryside forward toward decentralization. 15 He indicates that the 
alliance between farmers and reformers took place due to the farmers' desire to escape the 
institutional confines of collective poverty while loosing opportunity costs as the reformers sought to 
protect farmers as they experimented with decollectivization. 16 Barrington Moore states that when 
elites divide, causing a checks and balances system of sorts, the probability of democratic outcomes 
increase substantially. I? Samuel Huntington further ar!:,'Ues that divided elites move authoritarian 
regimes into a zone of expanded political choice. 18 This is indeed the case in China where officials 
from Beijing down to the smallest village remain split on the meaning of the village election system 
10 Thid.
 
11 (Jacobs 1991; Shi, 1999; O'Brit:Il1(98)
 
12 (Tsai, 2000;Kdliher, 1997; Yang and Su 2000; Li ,md O'Brien 1996, 1998; Horsdy 2000; Kennedy 2000; Li 2000; Ogden
 
2000, Zweig and Chung 2000;Gad~en 20(0)
 
13 O'Brien, Kevin and Lianjiang Li. "The Struggle over Village Elections". The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Refi:lrills.
 
Edited by Merle<To1dman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1(99), pp. 129-144. (Page nO)
 
14 Kelliher, David. "The Chinese Debate ()ver Village Sdf-(Tovernment". The (:hiIUlJoumal. no ?7, Jan. 1997, pp. 6?-86
 
,md O'Brit:Il, Kevin and Li,mjiang Li. "The Struggle over Village Elections". TIle Paradox ofChina's Post-Mao
 
Ref(lrills. Edited by Merle (joldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cmnbridge: Harvard University Press 19(9), pp. 129-144.
 
(l'age 1?O)
 
15Zweig, David. "Rurall'eople, the Politicians, mld Power", The (nina Journal. No. ?8, July 1997. (I'age 156)
 
16 Thid.
 
17 Moore, Barrinb>ton. "Social Origins ofDictatorship ,md Demm..
Tacy", 1966. Bunce, Valerie. "Comparative 
demoaatization: big ,Uld bounded generalizations". Comparative Political Studies. v. ??no617, Aug./Sep. 2000, pp. 70?-?4. 
IX Huntinb>ton, Samuel. "lhe TIlird Wave", 1991. Bunce, Valerie. "Comparative democratization: big and bounded 
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on whether an election system should exist at all, which has allowed village governments and 
villagers to playa leading role in addressing local issues. In fact, Tianjin Shi's analysis of the role of 
the Ministry of Civil Mfairs in passing the legislation and implementing village elections follows 
Moore's thesis as the Ministry of Civil Affairs gained influence and political freedom among 
national government organs. 19 
Valerie Bunce states that new democracies often exhibit a considerable gap between formal 
institutions, which meet democratic standards, and informal practices, which do not, and concludes 
that democracy cannot be fully realized without the rule of law.20 Although, China may not be 
considered a new democracy it appears to be moving toward experimental democratic practices. 
Thus it is important to understand the central government's reasons for adopting the Organic Law 
and self-government to understand the extent unto which the CCP is pursuing the universal 
implementation of the Organic Law rather than just its legislative passage. 
A few scholars have mentioned that elections are a form of an escape valve for the government 
allowing villagers to release their tensions. 21 Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan state, "Fortunately, the 
best mechanism for dealing with both economic success and economic failure is the same: a free, 
competitive election. If such a mechanism does not exist when there is a downturn, however, the 
pressures for change might be so compelling that the only alternatives would be repression or violent 
revolution.,,22 Pastor and Qingshan Tan suggest that the central government perceived rural China as 
a serious threat to its ability to stay in power. The central government's cautious attitude toward a 
threatening and unruly peasantry is certainly reflected in the Party's negotiations, passage, and 
implementation of the village election system. 
Kelliher clarifies that self-government does not permit people to alter the state's demands; it only 
allows them to determine how to meet those demands.23 By voting for the local government and 
generalizations". Comparative Political ,\'tudies. v. :13 noo/7, Aug.lSep. 2000, pp. 703-34.
 
19 TIle MC ~A was allowed to pur~ue libcral rd()rmi~t policies due dt:bate within the CX~P.
 
20 Bunct:, Valcrie. "Comparative democratization: big and bounded generalizations". Gnnparative Political Studies. v. 33
 
noo/7. Aug.lSep. 2000, pp. 703-34.
 
21 P~l~tor, Robert A. ~md Qingsll~m Tan. "The Me~U1ing of China's Village Elt:ctions". The China Quarterly. No. 102 June
 
2000, pp. 490-512. (Page 512).
 
22 Thid. 
2.1 Kd1ilicr, David. "TIle Chines<: Debate Over Village Sdf..(Jovemment". The China Journal. no 37, J~U1. 1997, pp. 03­
Ro. (Page 73) 
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therein creating it, villagers become enshared in the responsibility for the government's actions.24 
Thus blame is taken off the shoulders of the central government and put onto local government 
bodies. The decentralization process sheds all direct developmental responsibilities from the central 
government to local government bodies; making elected local officials fully accountable. Before the 
Organic Law the CCP shared in the responsibility of minor local development schemes due to its 
sponsorship and participation in a system in which local cadres were appointed and in some cases 
imported from other areas. 25 
Research Design: 
A detailed analysis of the drafting process of the 1998 Organic Law preceding the implementation is 
necessary in order to detennine the regime's motivations and intent. A number of catalysts initiating 
reform and debate such as fiscal decollectivization; the introduction of the household responsibility 
system (HRS) and the death of the commune system; increased rural unrest due to corruption, 
economic stagnation and a !:,Tfowing income gap; the decline of the Party's legitimacy; a poor human 
rights international reputation after 1989; and numerous failed socialist education campaigns reveals 
the intent of the National People's Con!:,Tfess for supporting the notion of self-governance after a 
twenty-year period and answers the basic question of why the notion of village self-governance ever 
emerged in an authoritarian state. 
The role of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) in the drafting process is particularly interesting and 
deserves attention. Tianjian Shi believes the MCA was quite subversive and strategic when 
employing tactics and methods to go about gaining approval from political elites.26 He suggests that 
the MCA's desire for grassroots democracy is far stronger than that of the central government. 27 The 
negotiation process also discloses how Peng Zhen, the vice chairman of the National People's 
Con!:,Tfess Standing Committee (NPCSC) and primary supporter of !:,Tfassroots democracy through the 
24 Ibid. 
2S Hei Tao Yuan, Yunnan (one of my case study villages) had a village director brought in from a completely different area of 
Yutman by the CCI' f(lr a number of years until he was voted out of office during an election in 2000. The villager I spoke with 
said that the imported leader didn't really know how the village operated and was treated as an outsider. The villager attributed 
the appointed villager's defeat to his troublesome ,md talkative witt:. Once relieved of his duties, the f(lrmer cadre quietly 
removed himselffrolll the village political scene. 
26 Tianiin Shi. "Village Committee Electims in China: fustitutionalist Tactics f(lr Democracy". World Politics 51 
(April 1999). 385-412. 
27 Ibid. 
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fonnulation of villager's committees, gained necessary ideological support through advocating that 
the Organic Law would ensure political stability. 28 
After presenting the main events throughout the drafting process of the Organic Law, the regime's 
current efforts to strengthen the Organic Law and local governments are better understood. The 
central government's policies regarding township elections, financial support for local salaries, legal 
enforcement measures, Party-controlled local political infrastructure, neo-liberal marketization, and 
media control further suggest the regime's desire to drastically decrease its involvement and 
responsibility in the countryside through installing a village election system. 
Institutional Responses to the Death of Maoist/Socialist Thought in the Countryside, the Threat 
of Rural Unrest, and Decollectivization: 
The transformation ofthe Chinese countryside 
The earliest purpose of the promotion of self-government was to address a decline in social order and 
a broader political crisis that became apparent as family farming under the household responsibility 
system (HRS) evolved and the brigades and production teams of the Mao era ceased to function. 29 In 
1979 Deng Xiaoping stated that "we have practiced democracy enough, and our systems and 
institutions leave much to be desired":lO. Just a year later Deng called for "practicing people's 
democracy to the full", particularly at the !,Tfassroots.:n Pressures and radical change in the 
countryside are responsible for Deng's promotion of !,Tfassroots democracy. The dismantling of the 
rural communes and the birth of the HRS following the Cultural Revolution left a vacuum in political 
and community organization in China's vast and impoverished countryside below the township level, 
as well as a legacy of mistrust between fanners and Party cadres. J2 According to Bernstein, 
perceptions of threat helped HRS gain a foothold in the countryside. JJ The regime's efforts during 
this time (1978-1983) were unusually helpful to peasant interest due to the threat of unrest and its 
2R (),Brien, Kevin ;md Lim~iiallg Li. "The Struggk owr Village Ekctions". The Pamdox of China's Post-Mao Rdl1rnls.
 
Edited hy Merle (Yoldmall ;md Roderick MacFarquhar ( ~mllhridge: H;rrvard l Jniwrsity Press 1999), pp. 129-144. (Page 114)
 
29 O'Brien, Kevin ;md Lianjiang Li. "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One Party State: Introducing Village Ekctions
 
in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 June 2000, pp. 465-489. (page 4(5)
 
30 Thid. (Page 4(7) Ikng Xiaoping. Selected Work'> 1975-1982. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p. 181.
 
31 Thid. (Page 4(7) Hinton, Harold C. The Peopk's Repuhlic of China 1979-1984. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1986, p.
 
108. 
32 Horsely, Jmllie 1'. "Villager Self..(Yowmance and Rule ofLaw in China". Villager .\'elFlt;overnrnent and Rural Sodal 
[),,'Velopment Conference Papers. Beijing: September 2 -5,2001, pp. 106-112. (I'age 107) 
33 Bem~1ein, TIHllnaS 1'. "Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses". The Paradox of (~hina's Post-Mao Rdl1rnls. Edited hy 
Merk (Yo1dlllan ;md Roderick MacFarquhar. Cmnhridge: Harvard University Press 1999, pp. 197-219. Po1icyrnakers mowd from 
outright rejection of the HRS at the Third Plenum to at tir~1 highly restricted ;md ultimately full acceptmce ofthe HRS, that is, of 
fiunily contract funning, despite its earlier harsh repudiation ,l'> capitalist hy Mao in 1962 (204). (I'age 2(5) 
6 
responsiveness during this period was high as the regime allocated necessary new resources to the 
agricultural sector and came to support the abolition of the commune system. 34 
The simultaneous spread of the rural household contract responsibility system with wages linked to 
production output, first initiated by the peasants themselves, revitalized their desire for autonomy.35 
As the commune system fell apart, peasants slowly took control of their economic lives.36 In early 
1978, a few farmers in a village in Anhui province took an oath of mutual loyalty and divided the 
land among households in the villages.37 The farmers were willing to risk a severe response from the 
CCP due to their destitute living conditions.38 Villagers organized the first village committees in 
several places to manage communal properties and a!,,'Ticultural production by 1980. Horsely 
comments on the creation of village committees, "It made sense that the imperial system of relative 
village autonomy should be revived in some form to fill the political vacuum and help ensure 
stability in the countryside".39 Party leaders endorsed the development, hoping that the committees 
would promote stability and economic prosperity by allowing villagers to choose leaders they trusted 
and making those leaders directly accountable to their constituents". 40 
The regime also hoped the village committees would aid in repairing the strained relationship 
between villagers and the state and the party.41 Originally village committees were freestanding and 
relatively autonomous non-governmental bodies that did not take part in the allocation of state 
resources such as land or quOtas. 42 Rather typical undertakings included enacting codes of conduct 
banning gambling and theft, maintaining irrigation ditches, paving roads and repairing bridges, and 
mediating disputes. 43 At this point in time, village committees were not expected to help the 
34 Thid. (Page 199)
 
:15 Horsdy. Jamie P. "Villager Sdf-<Tovernance and Rule ofLaw in (~h.ina". Villager SelFgovernment and Rural Social
 
Development Conj£~rence Papers. Beijing: September 2 -5, 2001, pp. 106- H2. (Page 1(7)
 
:16 Rural areas were the f(1renmuers in the movement away from a strictly controlled public sector economy toward a more
 
privately owned one begiIming in the XOs. The upsurge in surplus labor, the proliferation of private markets, the switch to the
 
household responsibility system, and the burgeoning of local indu'itries created new sets of demand'i, expectations, skills, :md
 
relationships at the local level.
 
:17 Zweig, David. "Rural People, the Politicians, and Power". The China Journal. No. 3X, July 1997. (Page 155)
 
:1R Thid. (Page 155)Many fllTlllers during this time period were f11ced with poverty, draught. and hunger.
 
:19 Horsely. Jamie P. "Villager Sdf-Governance and Rule ofLaw in China". Villager Se!f:government and Rural Social
 
Development Conference Papers. Beijing: September 2 -5,2001, pp. 106- H2. (Page 1(7)
 
40 Horsdy, Jamie P. "Villager Self-Governance and Rule ofLaw in China". Villager SelF~overnment and Rural Social
 
Development Conj£nmce Papers. Beijing: September 2 -5, 20(H, pp. 106- H2. (Page 107)
 
41 Thid. (I'age 1(7)
 
42 O'Brien, Kevin and Lianjiang Li. "AcconmlOdating 'Demo{,Tacy' in a CJue Party State: Introducing Village Elections
 
in China". The China [marterly. No. 162 June 2000. pp. 465-4X9. (page 4(6)
 
4} Thid. (Page 4(6)
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township enforce state policies as village committees are responsible to do so under the 1998 Organic 
Law today.44 
The central government does not recognize that rural reforms were highly influenced by the threat of 
an unruly peasant class. However, the fact that HRS spread far more rapidly than did the loosening of 
official restrictions (village committees were not mentioned in the Constitution until 1982)45, 
indicates that strong peasant demand played a major role in the initial stages of decollectivization. 46 
Government reports, on the other hand, focused less on peasant demand but rather on the efficacy of 
HRS in increasing !,Tfain output.47 HRS became more acceptable among the elite because the output 
of grain and cotton continued to be planned and subject to state procurement. This was particularly 
important to leaders such as Chen Yun, who insisted that peasants not be permitted to adopt practices 
that "happen to be ... in their interest" but were in conflict with the state plan.48 
The birth ofthe firs t Organic Law 
Work began in September 1980 on drafting a new Constitution to document and legitimize the 
economic and limited political changes that China was undergoing.49 By 1982 a revision of the 
Chinese Constitution was completed and mentioned a grass-roots organ called the "villager's 
committee", which would be elected by villagers to manage public affairs at the 10calleve1.50 This 
change in village governance, however, only took place on paper. The new villagers' committees 
barely had any autonomous functions and no elections were held.51 Shortly afterward, legal drafters 
within the MCA defended the Constitution by calling for autonomy and the status of village 
committees to be elected mass organizations by 1983.52 By 1984, the MCA, under the guidance of 
Peng Zhen, had drafted the first Organic Law. As the year 1984 came to a close 700,000 brigades had 
44 Thid. (Pagt: 4(6)
 
45 Horsdy, Jamit: P. "Villagt:r Sdf-<'yovt:rnanct: ,md Rult: ofLaw in China". Villager .\'e!f:governrnent and Rural Social
 
Development nmference Papers. Bt:ijing: St:pkmbt:r 2 -5,2001, pp. 106- 112. (Pagt: 107)
 
46 Bt:mstd.ll, TIHllnaS P. "Fannt:r Discontt:nt and Rt:brilllt: Rt:sponst:s". TIlt: Paradox of China's Post-Mao Rd1:mns. Editt:d by
 
Mcrk (yo1dman ,md Rodt:rick MacFarqullar. (~ambridgt:: Harvard 1Jrnvt:rsity Prt:ss 1999, pp. 197-219. (Pagt: 2(5)
 
47 Thid. (Pagt: 2(6) Rd1:1rm kadt:rs bt:camt: convinced oftht: dlicacy ofhoust:ho1d contracting a~ a gt:nt:rally
 
applicabk l.llt:thod t1:1r raising output, productivity, incomt:s, and divt:rsification, tht:rt:by laying tht: fiJUndation t1:1r all-round rural
 
dt:vdoplllt:nt (206).
 
4R Thid. (l'agt: 2(6) Cht:n Yun, Ikct:mbcr 22, 19X 1 in Sanzhong quanhui yilai, vol. 2, pp. 1057-105X.
 
49 Horsdy, Jmnit: I'. "Villagt:r Sdf..(Yowrn,mct: and Rult: ofLaw in China". Villager .\'elf:government and Rural Social
 
Development Conference Papers. Bt:~jing: St:ptt:mbt:r 2 -5,2001, pp. 106- 112. (Pagt: 107)
 
50 Kd1iht:r, David. "Tht: Chint:St: Ikbak Ovt:r Villagt: Sdf-<. YowIDl.llt:nt". The (nina Journal. no 37, J'm. 1997, pp. 63­

X6. (Pagt: (4)
 
51 Thid. (Pagt: (4)
 
52 O'Brit:n, Kt:vin and Lianji,mg Li. "Accommodating 'Ikl.llocracy' in a Ont: I'arty Stak: Introducing Vil1agt: Ekctions
 
in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 Junt: 2000, pp. 465-4X9. (Pagt: 472)
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been transfonned into nearly 950,000 villager committees. 53 The transition was met with little 
opposition and was carried out quite easily because at this point in time it was little more than a 
change in the name from brigade to villager committee due to the absence of elections. 54 
Although the first Organic Law was drafted in 1984 it did not draw attention or debate until 1987. In, 
fact the MCA revised the law forty times from 1984-1987.55 The 1987 Organic Law stipulated that 
village committees were to be directly elected by villagers.56 Prior to 1987, village committees were 
merely extensions of the township government and were not "mass autonomous organizations" as 
they were described in the law. 57 
Opposition to villager's self-government turned out to be unexpectedly strong when the MCA 
submitted the 13th draft of the Organic Law to the NPC in 1987. The fact that villagers no longer 
adopted Chinese socialist/Maoist thought and became more interested in individual progress after the 
failure and break-up of Mao's collective system fueled the opposition. A number of legislators rose 
to argue that the time was not "ripe" for a full-fledged law to be passed.58 Many deputies said that 
Chinese villagers lacked the "democratic consciousness" to govern themselves and openly doubted 
whether township ,guidance of village committees would be enough to ensure state interests in the 
countryside.59 
Opponents' concerns whether the time was "ripe" for village elections are certainly understood when 
one examines the situation in the countryside after 1984. During this period, a large amount of 
peasants complained that farming was not generating enough income. Grain output failed to reach the 
peak level attained in 1984 and rural per capita incomes, which had doubled between 1978 and 1984, 
largely stagnated in real terms during the remainder of the decade.60 Local officials "emphasized 
industry and neglected agriculture" as industrial profits and taxes became the primary source of local 
53 Thid. (Page 472)
 
54 Thid. (Page 472)
 
55 Ogden, Suzanne. "May the Be:>1 Villager Win!". Villager ,\'elf:govermrwnt and Rural Social Development
 
Conference Papers. B~iing: September 2 -5, 2001, pp, 167-17X. (Page 169)
 
56 Oi, Je,m C ,md Scott Rozelle. "Elt:(,1:ions ,md Power: The Ul(,'US ofDecision-Making in Chinese Villages". The
 
China Quarterly. No. 162 June 2000, pp. 513-539. (page 522)
 
57 () 'Brien, Kevin and Lianjiang Li. "Acconnnodating 'Democracy' in a One Party State: Introducing Village Elections
 
in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 June 2000, pp. 465-489. (470)
 
5N Thid. (Page 475)
 
59 Thid. (Page 472)
 
60 Bernstein, TIlOmas P. "Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses". The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Rd(lrms. Edited by
 
Merle (J(lldm,m and Roderick MacFarquhar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999, pp. 197-219. (Page 2(8)
 
9 
•
 
prosperity.61 As a result, the proportion of all local state spending devoted to a!:,'liculture reportedly 
decreased from about 6 percent in the 1981-1985 period to .8 percent by 1994.62 
In response, the government tied the supply of low-priced inputs such as diesel oil and chemical 
fertilizer to the amount of grain sales to the state in order to raise incentives.63 The system was 
certainly far from perfect. Local officials found it easy to make money by selling the inputs on the 
free market, which put farmers at a severe disadvantage.64 Cadres also diverted state procurement 
funds toward profitable investment, usually in township-village enterprises (TVE's).65 Since villages 
and townships without TVE's had no sources of funding other than farm households, these fiscal 
burdens took a disproportionate toll in agriculture-dependent villages.66 
Enforcing these policies and practices required local officials to resort to extensive coercive and 
threatening measures. Local governments issued large-scale IOU's to farm households beginning in 
1988 as a result of the aforementioned policies.67 This practice created a tremendous amount of anger 
and protest in rural areas and more importantly made the peasant class aware of its exploitative 
relationship with the state. Adversely affected farm incomes due to unpredictable variable fees, fines, 
and apportionments exacted by local and higher-level authorities only added fuel to the fire. 68 
Eventually the central government turned its attention toward the countryside in 1993 due to a wave 
ofrural disturbances and adopted the Law of A!:,'liculture.69 
Realizing the volatile situation in the countryside those opposed to the MCA's draft of the Organic 
Law feared that villagers would elect members to the village committees that would not respond to 
state interests, resulting in a loss of state control in the countryside. Opponents argued that elected 
village committee members might be inclined to take their orders from villagers rather than the state, 
which would interfere with the state's enforcement of its three unpopular state policies: tax 
collection, grain procurement, and birth control. 70 This would ultimately erode the township's ability 
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to enforce state policies.71 ill fact, most opponents recommended that the 1987 draft be revised; 
some, echoing the anxiety of detractors outside the legislature, went so far as to advise that the 
Constitution be amended so that village committees were converted into government organs led by 
appointed directors.72 Several deputies ar!:,TUed that cadres who followed the instructions from the 
township government would be defeated in an election. 
Those advocating for direct elections a!:,Tfeed that township leaders had to execute policies that 
villagers did not understand and fully accept. They stressed, however, that this did not justify 
resorting to tactics such as threats of coercion. According to self-government advocates, even the 
least popular measures could be implemented through persuasion and the mass line. They ar!:,TUed that 
elected village committee members would be more inclined to enforce unpopular state policies than 
township appointed village leaders.73 Supporters ensured NPC deputies that villagers would not tum 
self-government into anarchy. One MCA official who participated in the drafting the Organic Law 
commented "It would make the Party appear weak if we had to place this mass organization under 
Party branch leadership".74 
Despite the MCA's support for experimental self-government at the village level, no mention was 
made about specific elections.75 This is perhaps due to the fact that the MCA realized that the 
political climate of the period was not suitable for a debate about elections. On the other hand; little 
is known about the MCA's intent on implementing elections. The MCA recommended that the NPC 
approve the Organic Law in principle and authorize the Standing Committee to make further 
revisions before pronouncing the law.76 Thus in November 1987 the Trial Organic Law was 
legalized. The 1987 Trial Organic Law passed despite large opposition due to Peng Zhen's support 
and the inability of appointed investigation teams from the Ministry of Personnel to reach a 
consensus on the performance of village political organizations. The fact that the MCA decided to 
make popular elections the heart of self-government in 1987 was, ironically, occasioned by a 
conservative attempt to kill of the reform.77 ill order to determine whether or not the Organic Law 
and the idea of self government should be essentially dismissed the NPC, the Central Organizational 
in China". The China Quarterly. No. 162 June 2000, pp. 465-4119. (Page 470)
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Department, the MCA and the Ministry of Personnel assembled a team of investigators to report on 
the perfonnance on village political organizations.78 The appointed investigation team was not able to 
reach a consensus thus resulting in the NPC's decision to instruct the MCA to prepare a second 
report of its own79. In fact, the NPC actually advised the MCA what should be done. 
When Guangxi's report on village committees reached Beijing, Peng Zhen, then vice chainnan of the 
National People's Congress Standing Committee praised the villager's committees as the perfect 
vehicle for practicing grassroots democracy.80 As a result, Peng instructed the NPC and the MCA to 
send investigators to Guangxi to learn more about village committees. Peng's support encouraged 
experiments with village committees elsewhere as well. 81 
O'Brien and Lianjiang Li describe that Peng felt elections were not only compatible with Party rule; 
they were the right instruments for tightening the Party's grip in areas where its dominance was still 
uncertain. 82 Peng felt that elections would generate support for the Party's mission to strengthen 
socialist ideology while serving its state-building aspirations; thus "democracy" and government 
power could develop together. 83 Peng desired to boost China's democratic consciousness as his 
concern of worsening relations between cadres and fanners might cripple the Party's ability to rule. 84 
He believed that village democracy was a matter of "life or death" for the Party and warned that rural 
rebellion was possible if self-government was put off. 85 Peng asked, "Who supervises rural cadres? 
Can we supervise them? No, not even if we had 48 hours a day.,,86 Peng's comments were made at a 
time when concerns of worsening relations between cadres and farmers might cripple the Party's 
ability to rule. 87 
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Peng originally stated that village committees would primarily be responsible for improving public 
welfare, popularizing policies and laws, mobilizing participation in state-sponsored activities, and 
reflecting opinions to grassroots officia1s. 88 Interestingly, Peng's commentary on the Organic Law 
was usually centered on how villagers' autonomy would improve public order by curbing gambling, 
preventing theft, and reforming idlers, and how it would enhance self-service by enabling cadres to 
extract sums required for paving roads, building schools, and maintaining irrigation systems until the 
law drew heated attention in the NPC in 1987.89 In other words, Peng ar!:,'Ued that the existence of 
elected village committees would regenerate a commitment to the state and overall social order. Only 
when NPC deputies insisted that self-rule would interfere with policy implementation and lead to 
rural unrest did Peng shift to arguing that village elections were precisely what were needed to 
reinvigorate grass-roots governance and ward offpolitical stability.90 He attempted to reason with the 
opposition by assuring that democratically elected village committees would not produce chaos 
because "the masses accept what is reasonab1e".91 
The attempted murder and recovery ofselfgovernment 
Due to Peng's persistence and the mere fluke of the appointed investigation team's inability to 
establish a clear consensus on the village committee system, the execution of the Trial Organic Law 
was slated to begin in 1988. The law, however, was not fully implemented nationally once the 
democracy protests of 1989, the most famous taking place in Tiananmen Square in June, rocked the 
Party in Beijing.n For the first time, the debate on village self-government spilled into the Chinese 
press due to intensified criticism.93 Following the suppression of the 1989 democracy protests, 
opponents of villagers' autonomy demanded that the law be scrapped, ar!:,'Uing that it was an example 
of the "bourgeois liberalization" condoned by fallen party general secretary Zhao Ziyang.94 By late 
1990, supporters of tighter Party control and other skeptics were extremely concerned with social 
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instability and remained unconvinced that villagers would vote for cadres who enforced unpopular 
state policies.95 
Peng, knowing that his vision of self-government was in danger, successfully gained the support of 
influential leaders within the Party in late 1990, namely Vice Premier Bo Yibo and Song Ping (a 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee).96 Both leaders realized that relations between cadres 
and villagers had worsened in many places as villagers became more aware of their exploitation and 
less dependent upon their village cadres after the communes were totally abolished in the mid­
1980s.97 Song Ping put the controversy over the Organic Law to a conclusion by the end of the year. 
The Central Committee followed Song Ping's suit and decreed that each of China's counties should 
establish "demonstration villages" in areas that had "good working conditions" thereby seconding a 
1989 MCA decision to focus on better-off communities where mass-cadre relations were presumably 
reasonably harmonious.98 The implementation of "demonstration villages" was not entirely 
successful as the MCA encountered institutional difficulties from the Central Organizational 
Department (COD) at the local level. The COD was not sold on the idea of the Organic Law resulting 
in a considerable amount of local resistance from rural cadres due to the COD's control over rural 
cadres' promotion and performance evaluations. 99 Rural cadres were obviously more concerned with 
their own promotion rather than supporting efforts toward self-government. In fact, a notable number 
of officials who adopted village elections early had peaked in their careers and were not longer 
concerned with the COD's opinions. loo 
The implementation of "demonstration villages" was also impeded by the massive size of China. 
Rural infrastructures were and remain extremely weak, resulting in poor government communication 
and enforcement. MCA officials first worked with provinces closer to Beijing and !,'Tadually fanned 
out to other provinces. As a result, the provinces of Yunnan and Guangdong were two of the last 
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provinces to jump on the bandwagon of popular village e1ections. 11l1 In fact, Yunnan did not begin 
holding elections until 2000 even though the Organic Law was implemented in 1998. 11l2 Throughout 
the difficult implementation process the central government learned of the increasing difficulty of 
converging the interests of such a wide and contrasting geo!:,rraphic area. 
Motivations and events behind the 1998 Organic Law: 
Throughout the initial phases of the drafting process the central government feared rural instability. 
Those who supported the Organic Law argued that village elections would decrease the probability 
of rural unrest whereas opponents believed that village elections would only hinder the central 
government's ability to universally enforce its policies due to the removal of cadres who enforced 
unpopular state policies. The shift of socialist ideals in the countryside once the HRS was adopted 
certainly made decision-makers cautious and fueled the debate on self-government as they realized 
that the peasantry was no longer willing to be exploited and work for the good of the motherland. 
Although Peng was eventually successful in 1990, the MCA had extreme difficulty in implementing 
village elections in "demonstration villages". If the "demonstration villages" didn't tum out as well 
as expected then how and why did the NPC pass the Organic Law in 1998'1 What took place in order 
for the central government to finally join with the MCA and other reformers? These two questions 
must be answered in order to determine the true motivations behind the regime's decision to 
implement elections at the village level. 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs: 
Throughout the drafting process supporters and opponents consistently cited the possibility of 
increased rural instability as a key reason for or against the Organic Law. Although Peng's active 
sponsorship was essential to launching reforms that would open up the system, nationa11eaders had 
little influence over the implementation of the Organic Law. lll) By the time implementation began in 
1990, the leading opponent of the reform, Zhao Ziyang l1l4, had been purged, leaving most national 
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leaders indifferent. 105 The MCA was extremely influential in garnering support from elite decision­
makers within the regime to adopt the Organic Law in the 1990's. The colleab'1les of Wang Zhenyao, 
the deputy director of the Department of Grassroots Administration in the MCA, claimed in an 
interview with Tianjin Shi in 1989 that an "incremental or Fabian approach" toward self-government 
would be the ideal model for China. 106 They arb'1led that, "According to Huntington, the foot-in-the 
door approach for concealing aims, separating the reforms from each other, and pushing for only one 
change at a time" was the only way for the MCA to bring about any meaningful political reforms in 
China. 107 As a result, reformers in China did not advocate Western ideas such as liberty and 
democracy because they understood the constraints created by Chinese official ideology and realized 
that China was hostile to free expression and popular sovereignty. 108 
This particular claim suggests that the MCA's methods were tactically subversive as they aimed to 
undermine a political system through working from within the system. Tianjin Shi remarks, "Since 
institutions themselves are objects of contention in incremental reform, reformers can win political 
advantage by relying on time to transform structural parameters - that is, by waiting.,,109 When the 
implementation process formally began after June 4, 1989, instability in the countryside was one of 
the regime's primary concerns. The MCA and reformers played on the central government's 
vulnerability and made suggestions that helped the regime resolve practical problems in the 
countryside. uo 
No coherent strategy or long-term planned existed during the late 1970s and 1980s; however, once 
the central government was opened, the reform process allowed each step taken by the MCA to 
appear to be a natural response to the unforeseen consequences of the initial reform. 111 With this 
strategy in mind, Wang Zhenyao stressed in his public speeches that introducing village elections in 
rural China would significantly reduce peasant dissatisfaction and head off local rebellions and 
arb'1led that village elections was an application of socialist principles. l12 In study materials 
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distributed to local election officials, the MCA described elections as a cure for all that ailed the 
Chinese village and a ,guarantee oflong-tenn stability.ll3 
Clearly the MCA wanted to encourage more democratic procedures and thereby increase local self­
governance; however, they may have really wanted to help the CCP consolidate its power and avert 
foreign criticism, rather than trying to change the nature regime from within. 1l4 China's terrible 
human rights record is certainly a motivation behind the implementation of village elections. A year 
after the Organic Law was enacted China concluded its bilateral trade negotiations with the United 
States; forging China closer to accession into the WorId Trade Organization. Throughout the bilateral 
negotiations, the United States expressed concern over China's suspect human rights record. Perhaps 
the Organic Law strengthened China's claim that human rights were a top priority. 
When the MCA arranges for foreign researchers to visit models of self-government, it promotes a 
specific positive human rights image for China. 1l5 One minister within the MCA is perfectly clear 
about the usefulness of foreigners writing about village elections: "Their reports and commentaries 
help the international community to understand the reality of democracy and human rights in China. 
Objectively, they serve the function of aiding our propaganda".1l6 The internal newspaper of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs emphasizes that the key for positive foreign publicity is elections. 117 It must 
be noted, however, that the MCA may be seeking foreign publicity in order to push the regime 
towards further reform no matter what the reason. It indeed appears this way as the MCA continues 
to push for improved implementation procedures. 
Rebellion in the 1990s: 
Despite the MCA's true objectives, one thing is for certain; a shockwave of rural rebellion in the 
1990s put the fear into reformers and opponents alike. Both advocates and opponents of self­
government a!:,Tfeed that authority had broken down in China's countryside since the mid-1980s 118 ; 
however, not too many could imagine how disintegrated the regime's authority would become until 
the 1990s. 
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In late April 1989, when the Tiananmen demonstrations were gaining momentum, Deng Xiaoping 
assured Li Peng and Yang Shangkun that there "is no problem with the peasants" and assured them 
that the urban sector was the source of instability.ll9 He couldn't have been more wrong. Deng 
backtracked and changed his mind in 1991 and stated that China's stability relied on whether or not 
the lives of peasants improved. 120 Deng's reversal was due to a failed rural socialist education 
campaignl2l carried out in 1990 that was issued to rid the peasantry of "clannish thinking, feudal 
superstition, corrupt capitalist thinking, and other backward ideas" that they believed was 
tremendously affecting rural stability.122 The campaign failed due to the fact that peasants had 
repeatedly been offered the same sort of dissatisfying "education" many times before. In addition, the 
campaigns failed to recognize modem realities and cultural norms and practices in the countryside. 
By 1992 and 1993 a major wave of hundreds of protests, demonstrations, and riots in rural areas 
heavily dependent upon agriculture erupted. Cash-strapped local governments put heavy financial 
burdens on farmers due to the failure of state procurement agencies to pay the farmers in cash, 
resulting in the distribution of IOU's and widespread rural unrest. 123 According to Chinese press 
reports, at least 830 incidents of rural rebellion involving more than 500 people each were recorded 
in 1993, including 21 cases involving crowds of more than 5,000124. The most publicized case took 
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place in Renshou County, Sichuan, where villagers rioted in January and again in June 1993 to 
protest against assessments for road construction. 125 When the Renshou village authorities asked for 
money, the peasants demanded that they should have the right to participate in the decision-making 
process in exchange for money. The riots stunned centra11eaders. Vice Premier Tian Jiyun reportedly 
told Tiaqjin NPC deputies at the 1993 session: "If there are problems in the villages, no one in the 
present regime can hold on to power" and the consequences would be "unimaginable". 126 
In response to the rural explosion, an intense campaign was launched to eliminate "unreasonable" 
burdens and resources were mobilized to redeem farmer's lOUsY? Beijing canceled 37 fees charged 
by administrative agencies and 43 "target-setting" pro!:,'Tams such as "building educationally 
advanced counties", the expenses of which were apportioned among villagers. 128 The enactment of 
the Law of A!:,rricu1ture in the summer of 1993 was clearly a response to the disturbances. It gave 
farmers the "right to refuse" or to reject payment of improperly authorized fees, fines, 
apportionments, and compulsory fund-raising. The regime, however, failed to eliminate the burden 
problem. The central government's ambiguous formulation indicates an unwillingness to make a 
binding commitment to the HRS. 129 
The CCP decided to embark upon another socialist education campaIgn III 1994 entitled 
"Strengthening the construction of grass-root party organization in the countryside" in hopes to 
improve the quickly declining situation in rural areas. DO The campaign was monumental because for 
the first time in the CCP's history, a rectification campaign was directed at a particular level of 
organization and at a particular area, namely party branches in the countryside. 131 Work teams were 
assigned to "go deep into villages and townships to directly hear the opinions of !:,'Tass-root cadres 
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and the masses, obtain firsthand materials, and study the new situation"m. The Central Committee 
proclaimed that the campaign was to last for three years until 1997. 133 Aside from publicly 
committing to a lengthy campaign, the regime had the media report on the pro!:,'Tess of work teams in 
the villages. 
The socialist education campaign came as a shock to many peasants. The campaign of strengthening 
party construction in late 1994 was preceded by a campaign to alleviate the peasants' burden in 1993, 
which had vast political repercussions. 134 Peasants resisted the work teams in a wide array of 
locations and were mobilized and organized by village cadres and party members. Demonstrations 
and petitions were carried out and, in some places, the offices and houses of work teams were set on 
fIfe. 135 Ke Xianlong's article in the journal Xiangzhen Luntan (Discussion forum on Township) 
specifically reveals the villagers' reactions to the campaign when he describes that peasants feel 
"tired of it, disgusted, or afraid".136 In a Hong Kong journal Zheng Ming journalist Guan Chuan 
wrote that peasants not only complained, but also became an!:,'TY, and on several occasions they 
resisted the arrival of the work teams. 137 "Peasants work on land to feed the lords of the cities" wrote 
Guan Chuan. 138 
The CCP not only targeted peasants but cadres who were drawn to ally with peasants. 139 This 
occurrence was the regime's most disturbing during the campaign as the work teams tried to remedy 
cadres whose corruption was negatively affecting the village. The CCP had hoped to improve the 
behavior of rural cadres but instead found rural cadres uniting with villagers against the work teams. 
To add insult to injury the campaign was not taken seriously by the party committees as well as the 
party branches in the countryside. 140 
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The CCP intended to make rural cadres more loyal and responsible to the central leadership. "Some 
cadres lack sufficient understanding of the purpose of rural socialist ideological training" which 
meant a tendency for some !,Tfassroots cadres to ask for money, materials and projects for 
development, while they care very little about ideological education and "some work teams members 
are wavering their attitudes and their work is just so-so". 141 Liu Junlin related to the reporter of Liao 
Wang "They simply engage in window dressing, without doing deep and detailed work. Some others 
are in a war-weary condition, in slack mood, or are afraid of difficulty, such that they are just hastily 
winding up the matter"142. 
Despite a three year effort, the campaIgn led nowhere as situations of conflict with the higher 
authorities in terms of policy, rural cadres, including the party secretaries, continued to take sides 
with their fellow villagers. 143 This is evident in their participation in rural violence in 1995 in villages 
in Shanxi, Henan, and Hunan. 144 Masses and leaders went hand in hand to the government and 
attacked the officials who were suspected of having caused and unbearable "peasant burden"! 145 The 
rural party cadres did not hesitate to go along with their fellow villagers, adopting and voicing 
slogans. "All the riches of the land belong to the peasants! Stop the exploitation and oppression of 
the peasant class! Long live the union of the peasant class!,,146 Meanwhile, in some townships and 
villages they set up "Committees of Peasant Union", "Revolutionary Committees of the Peasants", 
and "Autonomous Government of the Salvation of Peasants", and "Committees for Directing the 
Peasant Revolt". 147 
Arbitrary expenses only worsened the CCP's campaign effort; they sparked the most intense rural 
anger while the regime neglected to act in the interest of villagers. In May 1996, three years after the 
adoption of the Agriculture Law and the campaign against financial burdens, the Central Committee 
and State Council issued another harshly worded edict against burdens, which had provoked 
"extremely intense" reactions from the masses. 148 In the autumn of 1996, new outbreaks of rural 
protest against arbitrary financial extractions exploded. Once again, central leaders issued another 
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major edict to strongly advise local governments to abide by the rules and reduce burdens on 
farmers. 149 
By mid-May in 1997, more than 500,000 peasants assembled, staged parades and demonstrations, 
and filed petitions in over 50 counties in Hunan, HUbei, Anhui, and Jiangxi provinces. 150 In some 
areas in Hunan and Jiangxi, such activities turned into violent riots. Beijing authorities immediately 
became panic-stricken. In response, they issued a total of six documents and sent out over 70 work 
teams to investigate the situation within one month. 151 Just before the implementation of the Organic 
Law in November 1998, a large peasant revolt broke out in Yizhang county, Hunan province during 
July 1998 where villagers appealed to the villagers' committee director to lead their protest against 
burdensome taxes. 152 
Throughout the drafting process the Party faced one failure after another, the Party's inability to 
enforce its demands leading to revolt and the failed socialist education campaigns in the mid to late 
90s signaled the regime's last attempt at restoring order in the countryside. It is at this point that the 
regime realized that it could not survive if it continued to be fully responsible for developing the 
countryside, as it no longer enjoyed the legitimacy of the peasantry and their local leaders. The 
regime's capacity to police the countryside was highly dependent upon its limited fiscal revenue. 153 
A survey revealed that only one-third of the nation's townships had police stations and judiciary 
assistants with one-quarter of the police stations having only one or two agents. 154 A bomb had 
exploded in Beijing and the Party realized it had to take any measure necessary in shedding itself the 
responsibility of making local leaders accountable to peasant demands due to its limited resources in 
order to prevent the peasantry from becoming upset with the regime. 
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Conclusions: 
Although rural instability in the 90s pushed the central government to decentralize its authority 
structure, the MCA has had an extremely difficult time implementing fair and open village elections 
universally in rural China for a number of reasons. However, a number of these difficulties could be 
better solved with more support from the central government. The regime's unwillingness to attack 
the roadblocks inhibiting the successful implementation of the Organic Law is a clear indication that 
the regime is no longer willing to risk direct involvement in rural political affairs. 
A wise investment? 
The Chinese government is well aware of the fact that the countryside is well beyond reasonable 
repair. Since the Deng reforms, China has enjoyed economic success and development among its 
urban areas. Many in the West perceive China as the next economic superpower, so it makes 
perfectly good sense why the Party would choose to invest its resources on urban projects that are 
more likely to turn a profit and become successful. This only aids the Party in portraying an image of 
success amongst its upper and middle classes and the rest of the international business community. 
However, by nearly exclusively investing almost all of its political and economic resources, the Party 
runs the risk of severe unrest amongst three-fourths of its population. 
China certainly favors the urban sector over the rural sector politically and economically. China's 
current electoral malapportionment favors urban areas. All three post-Mao election laws have 
mandated that each rural people's congress member should represent four times as many people as 
each urban people's congress member at the county level (Article 5), five times as many people at 
the provincial level (Article 12) and eight times as many people at the national level (Article 14).155 
Bruce Jacobs states three reasons explain this malapportionment: "First, owing to the 
overwhelmingly peasant nature of Chinese society, many interests would lack representation without 
such a malapportionment. Secondly, this malapportionment 'guarantees the leadership of the working 
class'. Many others believe the people's congress members must be 'competent' for the people's 
congresses to function effectively and fear a preponderance of poorly educated peasants would only 
further reduce the already low vitality of these bodies".156 The Chinese base this arrangement on the 
assumption that a legislator can only represent one interest. 157 
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The growing gap between rural and urban residents in China has been illustrated by a recent 
calculation of the Gini co-efficient, an internationally used means of measuring income disparity. 
The income gap in China continues to skyrocket as Mainland scholars and policymakers obsessed 
with neo-liberal marketization and WorId Trade Organization membership, continue to neglect the 
severity of the problem. Statistics gathered by the central government reveal that the Gini co-efficient 
between rural and urban incomes recently reached 0.59. 158 0.4 is considered a dangerous level l59 , so 
the high fi!,'Ure has significant ramifications for social stability in China's future regardless of the 
existence of fair and open elections. In addition, research analysts' reports suggest that the actual debt 
incurred by rural government's totals 800 billion yuan (US $100 billion), several times higher than 
the 200 billion yuan fi!,'Ure put forth by the central government. 160 
Despite being the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, peasants have frequently been 
exploited by the CCP as their interests often go ignored. Weixing Chen remarks, "Peasants were 
forced to sacrifice their own interests to support industry and urban residents. They were forced to 
sell goods and products to the state at discount prices, to plant !,rrain instead of profitable economic 
crops; and to submit to a set of exchanged that built relative prosperity in the cities while confining 
peasants to the penurious countryside. Chinese peasant hardly ever enjoyed the same kind of services 
and benefits provided by the state as urban residents and state employees, such a health insurance, 
pensions, subsidies, housing, and other state provided services". 161 
As a result, village directors are responsible for allocating public goods to villagers such as health 
clinics, roads, irrigation systems, and schools under the Organic Law further removing the central 
government from any sort of concrete development obligations. This requires the village director to 
develop some sort of strategy to obtain money whether it is collecting from door to door or simply 
resorting to threats and coercion. The current situation also forces the village directors to court the 
township and county governments for funds. The township and county government officials aren't 
directly elected by villagers and are known to handpick village director candidates. 
15H Mittenthal, Laurel. "Rural Ca<;h Squeezes Slows Retlmns". Chinese National Digest. XJ,murary 
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The allocation of public goods in each village is drastically different and is very dependent upon 
local conditions. In the small poor village of Long Quan Cun, Lijiang Prefecture, Yunnan the village 
director collects a flat fee from every family in the village for any sort of village project. 162 The only 
health care provided is through an American NGO and the villagers reconstructed the main road into 
Lijiang, the urban center, by hand themselves. The village of Caicun, Dali Prefecture, Yunnan is 
completely a different situation despite its similar distance from an urban center. 163 Caicun has an 
elaborate government building that houses the Party Secretary located on the main road into Dali, 
which was fully provided by the prefecture government. The village director of Caicun is a young 
career politician with Party connections and the village director of Long Quan Cun is an old farmer 
barely reaching subsistence. 
Local government personnel all over China are compensated extremely differently because the 
central government only offers financial resources for salaried positions as low as the township 
leveI164. For example, the village director of Long Quan Cun earns a mere 480 rmb a year whereas 
village directors of poor Mongol villages in Xingmeng County165, Yunnan earn 300 rmb a month 
compared to the Party Secretary's 1,000 rmb a month salary and the average Mongol villagers yearly 
income of2,614 rmb! The village director's pay all depends on the village's taxes and their guanxi 
with influential decision-makers in the bureaucracy. As a result, almost half of local governments are 
unable to pay local officials' salaries. To make up the difference, the officials often extort money 
from impoverished local farmers. 
Local governments can also garner sufficient funding from TVE's. The seven village directors within 
Najiaying Township166, the wealthiest township in Yunnan and located within 7-10 miles of 
Xingmeng County, all work in one of the township's 400 privately owned factories. In fact, 
according to the Vice Party Secretary, the village directors are strictly volunteers. The Vice Party 
Secretary briefly mentioned that businesses were preparing to meet the demands of WTO reforms. 
Privately owned factories and TVE's are becoming more and more vulnerable as China braces itself 
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for WTO refonns. Only time will tell how villages who rely on funding from privately owned 
factories and TVE's will be able to sustain their treasury. 
To-wnship Elections 
Aforementioned in the previous section, the Party only pays salaries for township167 and higher-level 
officials, thus not recognizing village directors as official government employees. The Party certainly 
perceives localized village government as much lower priority than higher rural government organs. 
The Party's interest in free elections, however, might not be so impartial if the elections move up the 
ladder ofgovernment. 168 
In 1998 President Jiang Zemin reaffinned his support: "Expanding basic-level democracy and 
guaranteeing the democratic rights of the peasants are not only the most extensive realization of 
socialist democracy in the countryside but also the utmost important policy that would return the 
initiative to the peasants and ensure long-tenn prosperity and security". 169 Li Peng praised the 
passage of the new electoral law and reconfinned that "democracy starts with grassroots in China 
because for an ordinary villager, the person who is of direct concern to him in not the provincial 
governor or the county magistrate or even the head of the township but the chairman of the village 
committee".170 On the other hand, in their interviews both men made points that are less encouraging. 
Jiang stressed the importance of strengthening the Party in the countryside, and Li Peng declared that 
the government would not pennit opposition parties. 171 
Various developments in 1997 and 1998 encouraged the regime to consider extending direct 
elections from villages to the township level. 172 Villagers becoming accustomed to more open and 
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competitive election procedures at the village level will most likely begin to demand a similar degree 
of choice for direct township and county elections. m 
In December 1998, a small township within Buyan County quietly went beyond the "public election" 
model and held a direct, popular election for magistrate. 174 The central government's reaction was 
mixed. On January 19, 1999 The Legal System Daily faulted the election for overstepping the law, 
and violating the principle of governing the county in accordance with the law, by not having Buyan 
Township People's Congress actually elect the magistrate. 175 However, they praised the democratic 
spirit in Buyun indicating that experiments and pilot projects for township elections were a 
possibility. The people of Buyun were very proud of their democratic initiative and the government 
allowed the initiative to go forward. 176 The Party, however, quickly changed its tone when the first 
open election of a township head was immediately deemed unconstitutional despite positive reports. 
The system still remains open to only one party and strongly plays on the Party's fears of increasing 
election procedures at high rural-level posts. For example, a !:,'TOUP of individuals attempted to 
register as the Democratic Party in 1998 and were eventually arrested by a somewhat hesitant 
government. 177 
Low enforcement efforts and loose laws 
The implementation of fair and open village elections outlined the Organic Law is of little concern to 
the central government, which further suggests that the Party used the Organic Law to shed itself of 
the responsibility of developing the countryside. Although the Chinese leadership supports grassroots 
democracy, there are numerous signs that village elections remain a low priority to them. This is the 
case for a number of reasons. The central government realizes that its investments in the urban sector 
mature quickly and are generally financially successful. The central government also understands 
that under the current situation, it has the ability to manipulate affairs at the village level more easily 
without taking the blame from the peasantry and finding itself responsible for failing to bring about 
much needed change. The central government is not strongly supportive of the MCA, despite its near 
impossible task. Although the MCA up!:,'Taded the Basic-Level Government Division to a Department 
in 1988 to implement the provisional law, in Beijing, only six people were assigned to work full-time 
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on village election and 11 to work part-time. In 1998-99, the MCA, like the rest of the government, 
has to reduce its professional staffby half, and it did so from 470 to 215. Although the bTfOUP devoted 
to village elections remained at roughly the same level; they were assigned additional responsibilities 
(such as registering divorces). 178 Only 5% of the workers were involved in basic-level government. 179 
A bTfOUP this small will not be able to educate and supervise all 930,000 villages! 
Villagers also have difficulty in bringing unlawful cadres to justice. In April 2000, the NPC Standing 
Committee in a significant and rare exercise of power, issued an opinion stating that village 
committee members and other personnel of village bTfassroots organizations fall under the definition 
of "state personnel" in Article 93 of China's Criminal Law if they commit certain crimes of graft, 
corruption and abuse of power when assisting the people's governments to carry out specified 
work. 180 Unfortunately, this interpretation only extends to village committee members when higher­
level government bodies are involved and not in respect to acts taken when fulfilling their work as 
village committee members. l8l In addition, the NPC's interpretation does not extend the Criminal 
Law provisions to election fraud and abuse. Certainly, further interpretations need to be made that 
hold village committee members accountable for their activities and election fraud. 182 
Villagers may have recourse under the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law and 1999 Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, when "administrative authorities" interfere with the exercise of their rights. 18:! 
Unfortunately, these laws do not specifically cover complaints of interference or other irregularities 
in village (or other) elections, and the penalties for obstructing implementation of the 1998 Organic 
Law are not clearly spelled out in that law anywhere else. MCA officials accuse the courts and even 
administrative agencies as reluctant to accept cases involving the Organic Law, thereby weakening 
its impact and often forcing villagers to resort to appeals to the press and protest actions. 184 
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Media 
Despite's the regime's poor efforts at improving enforcement mechanisms and improving localized 
rural infrastructure, it goes to !:,Tfeat efforts to publicize the Organic Law and promote the image of 
democratic practice in China. Posters, newspaper articles, television pro!:,Tfams, training sessions and 
other means are used by the government to publicize the Organic Law. 185 The CCTV soap-opera 
series entitled Big Official Hou is packed with Party propaganda encouraging recalcitrant activity. 
The twenty-two part series aired for one hour every weekday morning in the spring of 2001. 186 The 
show, for the most part, is an entertaining Party-sponsored tutorial enlightening villagers how to 
combat village corruption using the rules, rights, and regulations outlined in the Organic Law. The 
show particularly emphasizes methods and strategies villagers can employ to combat corruption 
carried out by the village leadership. 
The Party's efforts to educate via the media, however, are nowhere near perfect. Wu Fang and Jiang 
Yan, both employees of Yunnan TV, have encountered a number of stories regarding low-level and 
provincial level government corruption that they were not permitted to report. 187 The provincial 
government re!:,rulates the television industry in China and must approve of all news stories before 
they are aired on the nightly news. Generally, local and provincial media outlets report detailed 
stories about government corruption in cases where high-level officials are not directly involved. Wu 
Fang, a documentary journalist for Yunnan TV, has encountered a number of stories that he has not 
been permitted to report due to the involvement of high-level government officials. He has worked 
on a number of stories about villagers being displaced by their local village leader that were not 
what was It:gal :md what was not. Fanners flockt:d to buy it, and within 12 days, the handbook had sold 12,000 copies. But local 
govennnents complained that it would cause instability; 10 days after it was published, provincial ofl:icials banned it. In mid­
August, 20,000 fanners from five Jiangxi villages rioted again~'t tax burdel1~, citing the handbook as their inspiration. Police were 
dispatched province-wide to buy it back, offering several dollars more than the selling price. (Jui Xiaoqi, who ran COlllll1entaries 
fiJr Rural Devdopment, the magazine that published the handbook, was removed from his post. Trouble has also come to 
lawyers who support fanners' causes. In 1999, authorities in the northcrn province of Shaanxi sentenced Ma Wenlin to five years 
in jail fiJr representing 5,000 fanners fighting both high taxes and govennnent ofl:icials who beat the fanners if they did not pay. 
Despite a petition drive that collected 20,000 signatures fiJr his rdease, Ma is still in jail. 'These local officials don't believe in 
cOlllll1unism, they just want power and money. But Beijing understands. and we will continue to fight until BeUing hears our 
call'." l'ol1lfret. Jolm. "Seed~ of Revolt in Rural China: Fanners' Heroes give a voice to beseiged taxpayers". The Washington 
Post. Tuesday XMay 200 1; Page AO 1 httpJiw\vw.hartt<Jrd-hwp.comiarchivc/55/334.html. 
1~5 Horsdy, Jamie I'. "Villager Sdf-(Jovemance and Rule ofLaw in China". Villager Se!f:government and Rural.""ocial 
Development ConFrence Papers. Beijing: Septt:l11rer 2 -5, 2(J(H, pp. 106- 132. (page 119) 
1~6 Big Official Hou aired at around 10 a.m. when most villagers are fulfilling farming duties. There are phms to re-run Big 
(~fficial Hou at a more convenient time. (iray, Robert P. "Cadre Corruption, Village Elel,1ions, and Chinese Soap Operas: The 
Connnunist Party's New Conception ofRural Citizt:11~hip". Villager Se!Fgovernment and Rural Social De:velopment Conference 
Papers. Be~iing: September 2 -5, 20(H. 
1~7 Ji:mg Yan. Interviewed by author on March 25, 2002 in Kunming. Wu Fang. Interviewed by author on March 23, 2002 in 
Kunnling. Translator Lu Yuan. 
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reported to the public. The local village leader confiscates the villagers' land and sells it to higher­
level government officials who in turn sell the land to real estate companies. The villagers hold 
demonstrations in response to the government's actions. According to Wu Fang, villager 
demonstrations and displacement are particularly bad in villages right outside of Kunming's city 
limits. Jiang Yan, who works in the Yunnan TV Newscenter, says that when the former governor of 
Yunnan was ousted and thrown into jail for taking money illegally from businessmen, Yunnan TV 
only briefly mentioned the story while the centrally run government television station, CCTV, 
covered the story in more detail. 
Wu Fang feels that corruption cases involving improper election procedures and the misuse of village 
funds by village directors are frequent all throughout Yunnan's villages. He specifically recalls one 
case in the Yi nationality village of Piqimo in Yuxi Prefecture. Piqimo is one of the poorest villages 
in China. Despite the village's destitute economy, the village leader and the Party Secretary each 
owned a car. They obtained the money to buy their cars through selfish and illegal means. Their low 
salaries were not even close to high enough to afford a car. Ironically, the cars couldn't be driven 
because the roads in the village are in extremely poor condition. "The local leaders didn't care about 
the villagers' needs. This is very common" says Wu Fang. Like Wu Fang, Jiang Yan believes that 
"most officials are corrupt". A few months ago she came across a story where more than ten low­
level government officials were arrested for taking money from a !:,'TOUP of individuals attempting to 
influence policy. 
Scandals frequently occur in most villages, but very few are ever reported on Yunnan TV or to the 
general public through other media outlets. Each county in Yunnan has a newscenter that sends news 
to the senior station newscenter at Yunnan TV where Jiang Yan and many others sort through the 
reports to find unique and interesting stories to be broadcasted. If the county never learns of village 
or township corruption stories or if the county is involved in corrupt activity, the senior station will 
never be informed of corruption cases. This is also the case in other Chinese provinces. Only five 
scandals were reported to Yunnan TV during the last election cycle according to Jiang Yan. 
Conclusion: 
From 1978 to the present, the Party has attempted to lead peasants by sponsoring a modernization 
pro!:,'Tam and relaxing its control over the countryside, but in doing so the Party has created a 
dilemma for itself. Realizing that in order promote economic growth, the CCP relaxed its control 
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over the peasants and rejected one of the its most used political vehicle - mobilization. m The failed 
socialist campaigns of the 90s were the death ofParty mobilization and pushed the regime toward the 
idea of self-government and the Organic Law. As a result, the CCP might well be overwhelmed by 
the consequences of the empowerment of peasants particularly if the countryside is hit hard by the 
WTO reforms. Importantly, however, the CCP has given itself the perfect escape valve if a given 
scenario like this arises, the villagers can vent their blame and frustrations on the one's responsible 
for allocating public goods and development, the local government. In other words, the regime has 
implemented a cosmetic change to rural power structures. Village elections allow villagers to hold 
their village committee's accountable; allowing the central government to focus it's resources in 
areas where it can come out on top while village elections allows the Party to influence rural politics 
without taking heavy responsibility for underdevelopment, corruption, and general unrest. 
It is increasingly important to understand the intentions and motivations behind the Party's 
implementation of the Organic Law. The effects of the Organic Law will ultimately determine how 
problems such as environmental de!:,'Tadation, healthcare, education, and urbanization will 
be addressed in the near future. Studies have already shown that the Organic Law is not successfully 
implemented throughout the countryside and that the regime has done little to assist the MCA in 
tightening laws and enforcement mechanisms to improve the reputation ofvillage elections. 
Too much evidence exists suggesting that the regime is more concerned with developing the urban 
sector and perceives the countryside a threatening and costly cause. Thus the central government 
passed the Organic Law as a means to rid itself of the responsibility to directly involve itself in the 
troublesome affairs of rural local government structures. Importantly, the Organic Law does not 
directly threaten the Party's ability to rule in the countryside due to the Party's influence and 
presence at the township and county levels. This allows the Party to still dictate rural political and 
development initiatives without fearing a direct threat to its authoritarian rule. 
lXX Clu:n, Weixing. "Pea~,Ult Challenge in Post-Colllll1unist China". JoumaI4(~mtemporary China. No.6 Vol. 14, 1997, pp. 
101-115. (l'age IDS) 
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